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The Constitutionalization of Hearsay:
The Extent to Which the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments Permit or Require the
Liberalization of the Hearsay Rules
Edward J. Imwinkelried*
INTRODUCTION
England gave birth to the hearsay doctrine, "that most
characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence."'
American courts promptly imported the doctrine, and every
American jurisdiction currently recognizes a form of the rule
against hearsay. Some jurisdictions retain the doctrine in its
common law form while others have codified it.2
In England, the hearsay rule has been radically liberalized
by statute.3 Leading American commentators have proposed
similar reforms.4 Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence
relaxed the hearsay rule in many important respects,5 and sev-
eral states have experimented with even more liberal provi-
sions expanding the scope of hearsay exceptions. 6
Although the bulk of hearsay doctrine remains in deci-
sional or statutory form, the doctrine also has been "constitu-
tionalized."7 In some cases, the Supreme Court has held that
the introduction of hearsay admissible under a common law or
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
1. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 244 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)
(citing 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364, at
28 (James H. Cbadbourn ed., 1974)).
2. Id. § 246, at 729.
3. R.A. Clark, The Changing Face of the Rule Against Hearsay in Eng-
lish Law, 21 AKRON L. REV. 67, 70 (1987); Di Birch, Documentary Evidence,
1989 CRiM. L. REV. 15, 16.
4. E.g., Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86
MICH. L. REV. 51 (1987).
5. See Victor E. Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: An
Introduction and Critique, 38 U. CN. L. REV. 449, 475 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 83 (1970) (discussing GA. CODE
ANN. § 38-306 (Michie 1954), which created a hearsay exception for the decla-
rations of co-conspirators).
7. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 308 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
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statutory hearsay rule is unconstitutional.8 In other cases, the
Court has ruled that the exclusion of technically inadmissible
hearsay is unconstitutional.9 The danger, of course, is that by
constitutionalizing various aspects of hearsay doctrine, the
Court will "freeze" those aspects and stultify reformist
innovation. 10
The purpose of this Article is to define how much latitude
the courts and legislatures have for experimentation. Part I
discusses the extent to which the Constitution permits legisla-
tures and courts to liberalize the hearsay doctrine in civil and
criminal cases. Part II addresses the degree to which the Con-
stitution requires courts and legislatures to relax the hearsay
barrier and accept technically inadmissible hearsay in both civil
and criminal actions.
I. TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE FIFTH AND SIXTH
AMENDMENTS LIMIT THE LIBERALIZATION
OF HEARSAY DOCTRINE?
A. CIVIL CASES
The Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution
constrains the admission of hearsay testimony in civil actions.
Without such constraints, American courts and legislatures
would be free to follow the English lead and abolish the hear-
say rule. Some individual justices, however, have advanced the-
ories which would restrict the admission of hearsay in civil
cases. In two concurring opinions written in 1970, Justice
Harlan suggested that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments limit the introduction of hearsay tes-
timony.1 1 In the first case, Justice White also acknowledged
that it might be possible to derive from the Due Process
Clauses constitutional restrictions on the admissibility of hear-
say.-2 In the second case, Justice Marshall pointed out that
since the Due Process Clauses are not confined to criminal
cases, a due process restraint would apply in civil actions as
dissenting); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173, 178 (1970) (Harlan, J., con-
curring); Dutton, 400 U.S. at 105 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8. E.g., Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3152-53 (1990).
9. E.g., Chambers, 410 U.S. at 297-98.
10. See Green, 399 U.S. at 171 (Burger, C.J., concurring); idt at 173, 185
(Harlan, J., concurring).
11. Id at 184 (Harlan, J., concurring); Dutton 400 U.S. at 97 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
12. Green, 399 U.S. at 164 n.15.
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well as criminal cases.13
Even if the Court were to embrace Justice Harlan's sugges-
tion, a due process restraint probably would not be a formida-
ble barrier to the liberalization of the hearsay rule. Justice
Harlan indicated that the restraint would come into play only
when hearsay testimony was clearly "abuse[d]."'14 Justice
White opined that the admission of hearsay evidence would vio-
late this due process constraint only if the evidence was "totally
lacking" in reliability.' 5
B. CRMINAL CASES: DEFENSE EVIDENCE
As a general proposition, the prosecution may not invoke
the Constitution to restrict the admission of hearsay testimony
offered by the defense. The preceding subsection pointed out
that civil litigants might be able to look to the Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause as the source of a constitutional limi-
tation on the introduction of hearsay. The following subsection
demonstrates that the accused can sometimes succeed in citing
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause to restrict the ad-
mission of prosecution hearsay.16 However, the protection
available under the Fifth Amendment and the remainder of the
Bill of Rights was never intended to serve as an independent
source of government power. Therefore, it would be wrong-
minded to permit the prosecution to invoke either provision.'1
Thus, under the Constitution the courts or legislatures could
decree the free admissibility of defense hearsay testimony.'8
13. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 110 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also United
States v. Ianniello, 740 F. Supp. 171, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ('"e Sixth Amend-
ment guaranty of confrontation... should not blind us to the reality that the
question of the admission of hearsay statements .... whether in a criminal or
civil case, turns... on due process considerations of fairness, reliability and
trustworthiness."), rev'd on other grounds sub nom United States v. Salerno,
937 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Charles Jason R., Jr., 572 A.2d 1080, 1081 (Me.
1990).
14. Green, 399 U.S. at 184 (Harlan, J., concurring).
15. Id at 164 n.15.
16. Both clauses were designed to limit government power. Swader v.
Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434, 436-37 (E.D. Va. 1990).
17. Courts refused to allow the state to invoke the Due Process Clauses
in: United States v. Cardinal Mine Supply, Inc., 916 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1990);
South Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Township of Wash., 790 F.2d 500 (6th Cir.
1986); Delta Special Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. State Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.
1984); Board of Supervisors v. Virginia Dept. of Social Servs., 731 F. Supp. 735
(W.D. Va. 1990); Louisiana ex reL Guste v. Verity, 681 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. La.
1988); New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bowen, 661 F. Supp. 1537
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
18. A different result is possible under a state constitution. For example,
1992]
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C. CRIMINAL CASES: PROSECUTION EVIDENCE
There seems to be no constitutional restriction on the ad-
missibility of defense hearsay in criminal cases. In civil actions,
the restraint, if any, is minimal and grounded in due process.
Thus, the literature is understandably silent on these subjects.
In contrast, a massive body of literature discusses the constitu-
tional limitations on the admissibility of prosecution hearsay in
criminal cases. In criminal cases, the courts look to the Con-
frontation Clause as the source of the limitations. The Con-
frontation Clause neither explicitly restricts the admissibility of
hearsay nor expressly precludes a court from freely admitting
hearsay. 19 Indeed, Justices Thomas and Scalia have argued that
even in criminal cases, the "[r]eliability [of hearsay] is more
properly a due process concern. ' ' 20 However, current law re-
quires a two-pronged analysis under the Confrontation Clause
when the prosecution offers hearsay testimony.21 The prosecu-
tor may have to demonstrate the testimony's reliability and the
hearsay declarant's unavailability to testify at trial.22
1. The Point of Agreement: The Need to Satisfy the
Reliability Prong of Confrontation Analysis by
Establishing the Trustworthiness of the
Statements or the Availability of the
Hearsay Declarant
All courts agree that to satisfy the dictates of the Confron-
tation Clause, the prosecution must comply with a reliability
requirement. The prosecution may do so by demonstrating
either the reliability of the hearsay statement itself or the hear-
say declarant's availability at trial.2
a. The First Method of Satisfying the Reliability Prong:
Showing the Trustworthiness of the Hearsay
Statement Itself
When Justice Harlan initially delved into the meaning of
the Confrontation Clause in 1970, he rejected any equation be-
in 1990, the California electorate adopted Proposition 115, which provides that-
"In a criminal case, the people of the State of California have the right to due
process of law .... " CAL. CONST. art. I, § 29 (West 1991).
19. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
20. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 747 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring,
joined by Scalia, J.).





tween the confrontation guarantee and the right to cross-exam-
ination.24 Later the same year, however, he reconsidered his
position and adopted Wigmore's view that cross-examination is
the only prescription of the Confrontation Clause.25 The entire
Court eventually agreed with Wigmore and determined that
the right to cross-examination is the primary interest secured
by the Confrontation Clause.26
The question then became the nature of the right to cross-
examination. The Court has defined the right in functional
terms, 27 and views the right as a means of testing the accuracy
of testimony.2 The central purpose of cross-examination is to
augment the accuracy of the factfinding process.29 Cross-exam-
ination allows the questioner to probe for latent deficiencies in
the witness's perception, memory, narrative ability, and sincer-
ity.30 Cross-examination advances a practical concern for testi-
monial accuracy.31
Having equated confrontation with the right to cross-exam-
ination and defined the right instrumentally, the next step in
the Court's evolution of confrontation doctrine was predictable:
It concluded that the prosecution may substitute a showing of
the accuracy or reliability of the declarant's hearsay statements
for the right to cross-examine the declarant at trial.32 In Lee v.
llinois,33 all nine justices appeared to approve of this substitu-
tion. The Court said the primary purpose of the right to cross-
examination is to enhance the accuracy of testimony, and a
showing of the testimony's reliability substantially complies
with that purpose.3
24. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 182 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Harlan even proposed rewording the clause to reac "In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be present and to cross-examine
the witnesses against him." Id. at 95.
26. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
27. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540-41 (1986).
28. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64.
29. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 200 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Lee, 476 U.S. at 543; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
30. RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINEEs 568 (3d ed.
1991).
31. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S.
387, 396 (1986).
32. James B. Haddad, The Future of Confrontation Clause Developments:
What Will Emerge When the Supreme Court Synthesizes the Diverse Lines of
Confrontation Decisions?, 81 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 83 n.36 (1990).
33. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
34. Perhaps the clearest statement of the Court's view appears in the plu-
rality opinion in Dutton. Writing for the plurality, Justice Stewart declared
1992]
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In Ohio v. Roberts, the majority stated that "[r]eliability
can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."' When a hearsay
exception has longevity and is in widespread use, the consensus
on the exception suggests that the foundation for the exception
includes a satisfactory circumstantial guarantee of trustworthi-
ness.36 In effect, the Court presumes that testimony falling
within the scope of a traditional exception is sufficiently
trustworthy.37
On the other hand, Roberts also teaches that when the gov-
erinent cannot lay the foundation for a firmly rooted hearsay
exception, the prosecution must show particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.-s The
current majority still adheres to that teaching.39 Testimony
falling outside a traditional exception is presumptively unrelia-
ble.40 The presumption, however, is rebuttable;4' the prosecu-
tion may attempt to demonstrate that the testimony possesses
specific indicia of reliability.4 For instance, the Court has
ruled that because the residual hearsay exception is not a
that the possession of "indicia of reliability [is] ... determinative of whether a
statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of
the declarant." Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89. In Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213
(1972), a majority of the Court approved of Justice Stewart's declaration. The
Court has endorsed the position that a showing of indicia of reliability ade-
quately "compensate[s] for the absence of the ... opportunity for cross-exami-
nation" at trial. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973).
35. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
36. Haddad, supra note 32, at 84. For example, the Court has held that
the co-conspirator exemption from the hearsay rule is so firmly rooted that
trial judges need not make any independent inquiry into the reliability of testi-
mony qualifying under the exemption. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 183 (1987).
37. Haddad, supra note 32, at 85. The unsettled question is whether this
presumption is rebuttable or conclusive; even when testimony falls within a
firmly rooted exception, may the accused show that it is unreliable? As we
shall see, when the testimony does not fall within a firmly rooted exception,
the Court presumes the testimony to be unreliable but permits the prosecution
to rebut the presumption.
38. 448 U.S. at 66.
39. The majority reiterated this proposition in early 1992 in White v. Illi-
nois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 744 (1992). Only Justices Thomas and Scalia questioned
the distinction between firmly rooted exceptions and novel exceptions. Id at
747-48.
40. E.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) ("[Ihe Court has spoken
with one voice in declaring presumptively unreliable accomplices' confessions
that incriminate defendants.").
41. Id. at 543.
42. Id at 546.
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firmly rooted one,4 3 a prosecutor invoking the exception must
demonstrate that the hearsay in question possesses specific in-
dicia of reliability."
When the prosecution must make a particularized showing
that its hearsay testimony is reliable, two questions arise: How
rigorous a showing must the prosecution make, and what type
of factors may it rely on to make the showing? In response to
the first question, one respected commentator has asserted that,
although the Court's Confrontation Clause decisions "seem-
ingly" limit the admission of prosecution hearsay, the decisions
"in fact" do not impose "any significant limitations."45 Admit-
tedly, in Lee v. Illinois the majority referred to a "weighty pre-
sumption against the admission of . . . uncross-examined
evidence."4 However, it would probably be a mistake to
ascribe great significance to that isolated reference. Other deci-
sions have required merely "some" likelihood of trustworthi-
ness.47 As former Justice Marshall complained, indicia of
reliability are "easy to come by."43
The Court eventually may announce a test similar to the
standard governing the propriety of stops under the Fourth
Amendment. In that setting, the Court has held that to justify
a stop, a police officer need not have probable cause to believe
that the detainee has committed a crime.4 9 The officer need be
aware only of specific, articulable facts5° creating a reasonable,
founded suspicion of criminal conduct.51 In the hearsay setting,
reliability may be satisfied if the prosecutor can point to spe-
cific facts indicating that at the time of the statement the de-
clarant spoke truthfully or was in a position to gain firsthand
knowledge.52 There was a hint in Dutton v. Evans that the
Court might adopt a variable reliability standard and insist
upon a stronger showing of trustworthiness when the hearsay
43. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3147 (1990) ("We note at the outset
that IdahO's residual hearsay exception ... is not a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception for Confrontation Clause purposes.").
44. Id.
45. Haddad, supra note 32, at 78, 83.
46. 476 U.S. 530, 546 (1986).
47. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 99 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. 1& at 110 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
50. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
51. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
§§ 2003, 2005 (1987).
52. In Dutton, Justice Stewart evaluated the reliability of a hearsay state-
ment by reviewing the declarant's personal knowledge, the accuracy of his rec-
ollection, and his sincerity. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970).
19921
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is crucial to the prosecution's case or devastating to the de-
fense's case.53 However, in recent Confrontation Clause deci-
sions, neither the majority nor the dissenting justices have
resurrected that suggestion.
The Court has also grappled with the second question:
What factors may the prosecution rely on to satisfy the reliabil-
ity threshold? In one case the Court implied that the prosecu-
tion could point not only to circumstances surrounding the
making of the hearsay statement but also to other evidence cor-
roborating the accuracy of the hearsay.M However, when the
Court squarely faced the question in Idaho v. Wright in 1990, a
five-justice majority answered in the negative.ss The majority
couched the issue in terms of the "inherent" trustworthiness of
the hearsay.ss It stated that, in resolving trustworthiness, a
judge may consider only the circumstances attending the mak-
ing of the statement.57
It remains to be seen whether the Wight holding will con-
tinue to enjoy the support of a majority of the justices, as the
Wright majority included Justices Brennan and Marshall, who
have since retired from the Court. Justice Kennedy dissented
vigorously in Wright; analogizing to Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence, he pointed out that the cases clearly permit a police
officer, when weighing an informant's report, to determine
whether it provides reasonable suspicion or probable cause and
to consider other facts corroborating the report.-s Justice Ken-
nedy's argument may be even stronger than he makes it out to
be. As this Article explains,59 when the issue is whether de-
fense hearsay is reliable enough to trigger the accused's Com-
pulsory Process right to present evidence, the Court has
consistently held that the reliability is a function of both the
circumstances surrounding the statement and independent cor-
53. Id at 87 (rather than being "crucial" or "devastating," the testimony
was "of peripheral significance at most").
54. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 546 (1986) (writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Brennan apparently factored in the accused's confession in deciding
whether a codefendant's confession could be admitted as substantive evidence
against the defendant); id. at 554-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that in
making the decision, it would be proper to weigh both the accused's own con-
fession, and physical evidence corroborating the accuracy of the codefendant's
confession).
55. 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150 (1990).
56. Id.
57. Id at 3148-52; see United States v. Esquivel, 755 F. Supp. 434, 443
(D.D.C. 1990).
58. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3156 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
59. See infra part II.B.
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roboration. Newly appointed Justices Souter and Thomas may
favor employing the same approach for determining reliability
under the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses. If
so, the Wright holding will be short-lived.6°
b. The Second Method of Satisfying the Reliability Prong:
Producing the Hearsay Declarant at Trial
At common law, several distinguished jurists, most notably
Judges Hand6' and Friendly,62 argued for relatively free admis-
sibility of hearsay testimony when the hearsay declarant is
available at trial. They believed that the foremost rationale for
the hearsay rule is the suspect reliability of statements which
have not been subjected to cross-examination. When the de-
clarant is available at trial, the cross-examiner can question the
declarant about both the declarant's in-court testimony and the
declarant's earlier statements. They reasoned that the opportu-
nity for cross-examination largely satisfies the primary purpose
of the hearsay rule and therefore justifies removing the declar-
ant's earlier statements from the definition of hearsay.63
As previously stated, the Court has essentially equated the
confrontation guarantee with a right to cross-examine. Thus, it
starts at the same point as would Judges Hand and Friendly.
Consequently, the Court's decisions support the view that when
the prosecution cannot establish the reliability of a declarant's
hearsay statement, the prosecution may still satisfy the guaran-
tee by producing the declarant at trial.
Justices White and Harlan advanced this view in their
opinions in California v. Green.64 In the lead opinion in Green,
Justice White approvingly cited the pertinent opinions by
Judges Hand and Friendly and urged adoption of their posi-
tion.65 It seemed clear to Justice White that when the declar-
ant is willing to answer questions and submit to meaningful
60. See Ronald J. Allen, Foreward-Evidence, Inference, Rules, and Judg-
ment in Constitutional Adjudication: The Intriguing Case of Walton v. Ari-
zona, 81 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 727, 753-56 (1991).
61. United States v. Block, 88 F.2d 618, 620 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 301 U.S.
690 (1937); DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 268
U.S. 706 (1925).
62. United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933-34 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
377 U.S. 979 (1964).
63. This reasoning persuaded Kansas to exempt available declarants' pre-
trial statements from its definition of hearsay. KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 60-460(a) (Ensley 1983).
64. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
65. Id. at 154 n.5.
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cross-examination, "for all practical purposes" the accused "re-
gains most of the... protections" lost by the lack of an oppor-
tunity to question the declarant at the time of the making of
the statement.66 In that event, "the admission of his out-of-
court statements does not create a confrontation problem."
'
Justice Harlan expressed the same view in his concurrence.
He noted that in Green the prosecution had produced the hear-
say declarant at trial. He then stated: "That... perforce satis-
fies" the Confrontation Clause.68 When the declarant has been
produced, the declarant's earlier statements are "hearsay only
in a technical sense. ' 69 The declarant's production gives the
cross-examiner the opportunity to probe "the circumstances of
memory, opportunity to observe, meaning, and veracity." 70 In
one respect, Justice Harlan took an even more extreme position
than Justice White. The language in Justice White's opinion
about "full and effective cross-examination" 71 intimates that he
would find a confrontation violation if a physically present de-
clarant refused to answer all or most of the questions posed at
trial. However, Justice Harlan stated that it would be immate-
rial if "the witness [was], in a practical sense, unavailable." 72
The core of Green's reasoning is sensible. As the Court
noted in Green 73 and in later cases,7 4 the question of satisfying
the reliability prong turns on whether the record "afford[s] the
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
66. Id at 158. It is true that Justice White's description of his position was
somewhat unclear. In one passage, he asserted that the Confrontation Clause
is satisfied "so long as the witness [is] present at trial." I& at 157. In another
passage, he stated that the declarant must be "present and testifying at trial."
Id at 158. In still another passage, he indicated that the declarant must be
physically present, "testifying," and "subject to full and effective cross-exami-
nation." Id
67. Id at 162.
68. Id- at 188 (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. Id
70. Id-
71. Id at 159.
72. Id, at 188 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan stated
The fact that the witness, though physically available, cannot recall
either the underlying events that are the subject of an extra-judicial
statement or previous testimony or recollect the circumstances under
which the statement was given, does not have Sixth Amendment con-
sequence. The prosecution has no less fulfilled its obligation ....
Id-
73. Id at 161.
74. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
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prior statement. ' 75 When the declarant testifies at trial, the
trier of fact can study the declarant's demeanor while the de-
clarant fields questions about the prior statement. The cross-
examiner, of course, would prefer to question the declarant at
the very time the statement is made. Nevertheless, subsequent
cross-examination at trial gives the trier a sense of the acute-
ness of the declarant's perception, memory, narrative ability,
and sincerity.7 6 Armed with that sense, the trier is in a much
better position to determine whether the hearsay statement is
reliable.
The Court has not had an occasion since Green to rest a
holding squarely on the theory that the hearsay declarant's pro-
duction at trial automatically satisfies the Confrontation Clause
guarantee. All of the Court's recent citations to Green have
been approving.77 Consequently, there is no reason to believe
that a majority of the Court is ready to abandon the Green the-
ory. Therefore, the prosecution may continue to comply with
the reliability prong of confrontation analysis either by estab-
lishing the reliability of the hearsay statement or by producing
the hearsay declarant for interrogation at trial.78
2. The Point of Disagreement: The Necessity of Showing the
Declarant's Unavailability at Trial
In the preceding section, this Article noted that the prose-
cution may satisfy the reliability prong by producing the hear-
say declarant at trial. When the declarant testifies at trial, the
trier of fact has the opportunity to listen to the declarant's an-
swers and observe the declarant's demeanor. This helps the
trier decide whether the declarant's earlier statement is relia-
ble-that is, whether the trier may confidently rely on the
statement as a basis for factfinding. Although the courts seem
to agree that the declarant's production satisfies the reliability
prong, the courts are still divided on a related set of questions.
Assume that the prosecution opts to satisfy the reliability
prong by showing the trustworthiness of the statement itself
rather than by producing the declarant. Is the trier's opportu-
nity to assess the declarant personally so critical that the prose-
75. Green, 399 U.S. at 161.
76. Id- at 160-61.
77. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557 (1988); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402
U.S. 622, 626 (1971).
78. See, e.g., People v. Hayes, 802 P.2d 376, 395-96 (Cal. 1990) (en banc) (es-
tablishing reliability by producing the hearsay declarant for interrogation at
trial), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 420 (1991).
1992]
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cution must show both the trustworthiness of the statement
itself and the declarant's unavailability at trial? In other
words, must the prosecution establish a necessity for resorting
to hearsay testimony rather than the declarant's live
testimony?
The Court's treatment of this question has a checkered his-
tory, beginning with its 1970 decision in California v. Green.79
Justice White's opinion for the Court suggested that the declar-
ant's unavailability at trial is a pertinent factor in Confronta-
tion Clause analysis. He pointed out that the Court had
historically required "careful scrutiny" of hearsay testimony
predicated on foundational proof of the declarant's unavailabil-
ity.80 Nevertheless, he disclaimed any intention to "map out" a
comprehensive theory to decide when the Confrontation Clause
allows the introduction of an absent declarant's statements.81
In his concurrence, however, Justice Harlan did attempt to
map out such a theory. His reading of the precedents convinced
him that proof of the declarant's unavailability was a "thread"
running through the earlier cases.8 2 In his judgment, when it is
feasible for the prosecution to produce the declarant, "fairness"
demands that the prosecution do so. 8 3 He therefore urged the
Court to announce a general rule "requir[ing] the prosecution
to produce any available witness whose declarations it seeks to
use in a criminal trial."
The ink was hardly dry on the opinions in Green when the
Court rendered its decision in Dutton v. Evans.8 5 Once again,
Justice Harlan filed a concurrence. In Dutton, Justice Harlan
retreated from the position he had taken in his concurring
opinion in Green.86 Citing the examples of business records, of-
ficial statements, learned treatises, and trade reports, he argued
that requiring the declarant's production would often be "un-
duly inconvenient and of small utility. T8 7
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Dutton laid the issue to
rest for a decade. The controversy resurfaced in 1980 when the
79. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
80. Id at 162.
81. Id-
82. Id at 183 (Harlan, J., concurring).
83. Id at 187.
84. Id at 174; see also id at 182, 186 (reiterating).
85. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
86. Id. at 95.
87. Id. at 96.
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Court handed down its decision in Ohio v. Roberts.88 In the ma-
jority opinion, Justice Blackmun cited Green in asserting that:
[I]n conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accu-
sation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the
usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has oc-
curred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the un-
availability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against
the defendant.8 9
Concededly, Justice Blackmun cited Dutton in a footnote, treat-
ing it as limited authority that "[a] demonstration of unavaila-
bility... is not always required." 9 In text, he insisted that the
Confrontation Clause "normally" requires that the prosecution
establish the declarant's unavailability.9 ' Although he dis-
sented, Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Blackmun on the
proposition that there is a general rule obliging the prosecution
to prove the declarant's unavailability; he styled it a "threshold
requirement." 92
At this juncture, history repeated itself. In 1986, the Court
decided United States v. Inadi, involving the admissibility of vi-
carious admissions by co-conspirators. 93 Just as Dutton re-
treated from the powerful unavailability language in Green, the
Inadi majority attempted to distance itself from the strong un-
availability language in Roberts. The majority refused to inter-
pret Roberts as announcing a hard-and-fast unavailability
requirement.94 It pointed out that in the pertinent passage in
Roberts, all the cited cases related to the former testimony
hearsay exception which, both at common law and under con-
temporary statute, requires foundational proof of unavailabil-
ity.95 The majority asserted that "Roberts cannot fairly be read
to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court state-
ment can be introduced by the government without a showing
that the declarant is unavailable."
While the majority expressly repudiated a universal re-
quirement of proof of the declarant's unavailability, it stopped
short of disavowing the suggestion in Roberts that proof of un-
availability is normally or usually necessary. Writing for the
88. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
89. Id at 65.
90. Id at 65 n.7.
91. I& at 66.
92. Id. at 77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 388 (1986).
94. Id at 391.
95. Id at 393; see FED. R. EVm. 804(b)(1).
96. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394.
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majority, Justice Powell argued that it is peculiarly unsound to
condition the admissibility of co-conspirators' statements on a
showing of unavailability.9 Co-conspirators' pretrial, out-of-
court statements may be more reliable than their in-court testi-
mony, he reasoned, because accomplices are likely to speak
more freely and sincerely "when talking to each other in fur-
therance of their illegal aims."9 8 Justice Powell wrote that the
accomplices' trial testimony is unlikely to "recapture the evi-
dentiary significance of statements made when the conspiracy
was operating." In contrast, he noted, in the case of former
testimony-the hearsay exception employed in Roberts-the
prerecorded testimony is a "weaker substitute for live testi-
mony."'10 In Inadi, Justice Powell believed that under the for-
mer testimony exception it makes more sense to admit "the
weaker version" of the evidence only when the declarant is un-
available. 10 1 Hence, the general unavailability rule mentioned
in Roberts and the outcome in Inadi can be reconciled by inter-
preting Inadi as holding only that there are exceptional reasons
for dispensing with proof of unavailability under the co-conspir-
ator doctrine.
Until recently, the Court's post-Inadi pronouncements on
the unavailability question permitted the defense bar generally
to continue demanding proof of the declarant's unavailability.
Shortly after deciding Inadi, the Court handed down its deci-
sion in Lee v. Illinois.10 2 Chief Justice Burger, with Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, dissented, reiterating that in
the "usual" case the prosecution must generally prove the de-
clarant's unavailability. 0 3 The following year, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote in a majority opinion that "as a general mat-
ter" the prosecution must demonstrate the declarant's unavaila-
bility at trial.104 In Idaho v. Wright, the Court alluded to "the
general requirement of unavailability."'10 5 The majority approv-
ingly quoted the Roberts language to the effect that proof of the
97. Id.
98. Id. at 395.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 394.
101. Id.
102. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
103. Id. at 549 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 65 (1980)).
104. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987).
105. 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146-47 (1990); see State v. Gregg, 464 N.W.2d 431, 432-
33 (Iowa 1990); see also Donald A. Dripps, The Confrontation Clause and the
Sexual Abuse of Children, TRIAL, May 1991, at 11, 11 ("While the Court has
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declarant's unavailability is mandatory in the usual case. i06
Many commentators believed that the current conservative
majority of the Court would eventually hold that a showing of
unavailability is not constitutionally required for most hearsay
exceptions. 0 7 These commentators predicted that the majority
would ultimately embrace the position that proof of unavaila-
bility is necessary only in the case of hearsay exceptions, such
as former testimony, which have historically required such
proof as part of their foundation. 08 In spite of the decisions
cited in the preceding paragraph, the markedly pro-government
sentiments of the current majority lent credence to that
prediction.
Perhaps more importantly, the Inadi rationale cannot be
confined to the co-conspirator doctrine1i 9 In Inadi, the major-
ity rationalized dispensing with proof of unavailability on the
ground that an accomplice's in-court testimony might not be as
sincere as pretrial statements made to co-conspirators during
the progress of the conspiracy." 0 A similar argument can be
made to justify the admission of testimony falling within many
hearsay exceptions which presently do not require proof of the
declarant's unavailability. For example, an excited declarant's
trial testimony is unlikely to replicate the sincerity of the star-
tled utterance. In the same vein, a prosecutor might contend
that an employee's in-court testimony probably cannot dupli-
cate the quality of the employee's memory at the time she pre-
pared a business entry years before."' More broadly, a
prosecutor can plausibly argue that there should be an exemp-
tion from any need to prove the declarant's unavailability
whenever, at the time of its making, the hearsay statement pos-
sessed an indicium of reliability which would be difficult to re-
create at trial. The Inadi majority's argument sweeps so widely
sometimes bypassed the availability inquiry, in Wright the majority faithfully
undertook the analysis mandated by Roberts." (citation omitted)).
106. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3146.
107. See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 32, at 81.
108. I&
109. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the
Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 561 (1988); Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavailabil-
ity Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REv. 665, 689-709 (1986).
110. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986).
111. For a discussion of the importance of memory in evaluating the trust-
worthiness of hearsay, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of the
Memory Factor in Analyzing the Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson
Slowly Learnt-and Quickly Forgotten, 41 FLA. L. REV. 215 (1989).
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that the commentators' prediction of the deterioration of the
Roberts doctrine seemed well-founded.1 2
The Supreme Court's decision in White v. Illinois" 3 in
early 1992 confirmed the prediction. Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged in the lead opinion that Roberts contained broad
language "that might suggest that the Confrontation Clause
generally requires that a declarant either be produced at trial
or be found unavailable before his out-of-court statement may
be admitted into evidence."'114 However, the Chief Justice as-
serted that the Court's subsequent decision in Inadi "negated"
that suggestion.115 The White majority announced that "un-
availability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation
Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court state-
ments were made in the course of a prior judicial
proceeding." 116
D. SUMMARY
Although the applicable constitutional jurisprudence is un-
settled in some areas, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments permit
the courts and legislatures to go quite far in liberalizing the
112. If the prosecution must prove the hearsay declarant's unavailability at
trial, the next question which arises is what types of factual showings suffice
to establish the unavailability. The Court has addressed this question in sev-
eral cases. E.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (prosecution issued five
separate subpoenas to witness at her parents' residence, there were indications
that witness had left the state, and witness's mother testified that she knew of
no way to reach witness); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (witness was
an American citizen, but a permanent resident of Sweden; at the time the ap-
plicable federal statute did not authorize a federal court to require an Ameri-
can citizen to return to the United States for a state court proceeding);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (witness claimed to be unable to re-
member); Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969) (no attempt made by prose-
cution to subpoena out-of-state witness); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968)
(witness was incarcerated in federal prison in another state, but prosecution
neither sought a federal writ of habeas corpus ad testifwandum nor requested
the cooperation of the United States Bureau of Prisons). The leading prece-
dent, however, is certainly Barber v. Page. Barber enunciated the general
principle that the prosecution must make a good faith effort to bring the de-
clarant to the site of trial. 390 U.S. at 724-25. As a constitutional minimum,
the prosecution must either exhaust all available means of compulsory process
or make a persuasive, case-specific showing that it would be futile to resort to
the process. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 51, § 1303, at 329 (1987).
113. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
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current rules governing the admissibility of hearsay.117 Even if
the Court ultimately recognizes a due process restraint in civil
cases, it will probably be minimally restrictive. In criminal
cases, no constitutional impediments prevent the routine admis-
sion of defense hearsay. Additionally, even the standards con-
trolling the admissibility of prosecution hearsay could be
substantially relaxed. If the prosecution can invoke a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, there is no need for a particularized
showing of reliability. But even when such a showing is
mandatory, indicia of reliability may be "easy to come by."
Further, in most cases the prosecution will not be required to
117. Figure I depicts the extent of constitutionally permissible
liberalization:
FIGURE I
THE EXTENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY LIBERALIZATION
COMPLETE FREE
EXCLUSION ADMISSIBILITY






* Defense evidence in criminal cases.
** Evidence in civil actions on the assumption that the due process clause constrains
the admission of totally unreliable hearsay.
Prosecution evidence in criminal cases. This diagram assumes arbitrarily that
only 50% of the universe of hearsay possesses adequate indicia of reliability.
The diagram further assumes that at least in some cases the prosecution will have
to demonstrate the declarant's unavailability as well as the reliability of the
statement.
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establish the declarant's unavailability at trial. In White, the
majority severely reduced the scope of the unavailability re-
quirement. In short, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments would
permit American jurisdictions to follow the English lead and
significantly liberalize the admissibility of hearsay.




Part I dealt with the question of whether the Constitution
would permit the relaxation of American hearsay rules. The
more interesting question is whether the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments mandate liberalization.
A. CRIMINAL CASES: PROSECUTION EVIDENCE
An accused may invoke well-established constitutional the-
ories to override hearsay rules blocking the admission of excul-
patory testimony. Prosecutors have occasionally appealed to
the same theories to justify overcoming hearsay rules barring
the admission of inculpatory testimony.118 These appeals are
spurious. The theories in question rest on the Bill of Rights,
most notably the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and
the Sixth Amendment compulsory process guarantee. This Ar-
ticle has observed that the Bill of Rights was never intended to
serve as a source of government power." 9 Rather, its raison
d'etre is to function as a limitation on that power. Thus,
although the Court's Confrontation Clause decisions would per-
mit a significant relaxation of the standards for admitting pros-
ecution hearsay, no tenable constitutional theory necessitates
the relaxation.
B. CRIINAL CASES: DEFENSE EVIDENCE
1. The Accused's Constitutional Right to Present Favorable
Evidence
Because the prosecution cannot claim protection under the
Bill of Rights, routine admissibility of defense hearsay is consti-
118. United States v. Sanchez, 380 F. Supp. 1260, 1273 (N.D. Tey. 1973),
aff'd, 508 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Steven G.
Churchwell, The Constitutional Right to Present Evidence: Progeny of Cham-
bers v. Mississippi, 19 CRIm. L. BULL. 131, 143 (1983).
119. See supra part I.B.
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tutionally permissible. Moreover, the Constitution requires the
liberalization of the standards governing the introduction of de-
fense hearsay.
The accused, unlike the prosecutor, can avail herself of an
established body of doctrine to override common law and statu-
tory hearsay rules. This doctrine originated in the 1967
Supreme Court decision, Washington v. Texas.120 Washington,
charged with homicide, attempted to call Fuller as a defense
witness. Fuller would have given exculpatory testimony, but
he had already been convicted for his involvement in the same
incident.121 Two state statutes provided that persons charged
with or convicted of the same offense as the accused were in-
competent as defense witnesses.122 The trial judge relied on
these statutes in refusing to permit Washington to call Fuller to
the stand.23
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Washington's con-
viction. Chief Justice Warren, writing the majority opinion,
stated that the accused has a constitutional right "to put on the
stand a witness who [is] physically and mentally capable of tes-
tifying to events that he ha[s] personally observed, and whose
testimony [is] relevant and material to the defense."' 2 4 The
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause incorporates Sixth Amendment compulsory process and
thereby renders the latter guarantee directly enforceable
against the states.125 The State contended that it had not vio-
lated Washington's compulsory process rights. Although the
State was willing to subpoena Fuller and produce him at trial,
it merely objected to Fuller testifying.2 6 Chief Justice Warren
stated that it was absurd to think the Framers intended to con-
fer on an accused the hollow right to produce witnesses at trial
from whom he or she could not elicit testimony.127 The Court
held that the express compulsory process right includes an im-
plied right to present defense testimony.us The Texas statutes
120. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
121. IM at 16.
122. I& at 16 n.4.
123. I& at 17.
124. Id- at 23.
125. Id- at 18-19.
126. Id. at 19.
127. Id. at 23. The Chief Justice stated that he refused to believe that
"[t]he Framers ... intend[ed] to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant
the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no




therefore ran afoul of the Compulsory Process Clause because
they completely barred a defense witness from taking the
stand, thus impeding the presentation of defense testimony.
In Washington, the Court dealt with an incompetency rule
which barred altogether a defense witness from testifying.
Washington did not define the scope of this new constitutional
right allowing the defense to put its witness on the stand. It
did not, moreover, address whether the state may freely impose
regulations on the content of the witness's testimony, or
whether the accused may also invoke Washington to strike
down such regulations. Some lower courts limited Washington
merely to invalidating broad incompetency rules that bar de-
fense witnesses from the stand' 9 and held that state hearsay
rules were immune from attack.130
The Supreme Court's decision in Chambers v. Mississippi
proved these lower courts wrong.' 3 ' Chambers stood trial for
homicide. The defense asserted that the real killer was a man
named McDonald. McDonald had told several acquaintances
that he was the killer; furthermore, he had made a sworn con-
fession to Chambers' attorneys stating that he shot the vic-
tim.1 32 Both immediately before and at trial, McDonald denied
his guilt.'3 3 When the defense attempted to introduce testi-
mony about McDonald's out-of-court statements, the prosecutor
objected that the unsworn statements were hearsay. The de-
fense rejoined that the statements fell within the declaration-
against-interest hearsay exception, but the prosecution argued
that state law limited that exception to declarations against pe-
cuniary interest.'3 These declarations were contrary to Mc-
Donald's penal interest; the trial judge therefore excluded the
testimony regarding his unsworn statements13s
On appeal, the Court reversed. Speaking for the majority,
Justice Powell stressed that the statements in question "bore
persuasive assurance of trustworthiness" because they were
made and later offered at trial "under circumstances that pro-
129. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Chambers v. Mississippi, - U.S. - (1973):
The Constitutional Right to Present Defense Evidence, 62 MIL. L. REv. 225,
241-42 (1973) (citing cases).
130. E.g., People v. Scott, 288 N.E.2d 478, 482 (1972), cert denied, 410 U.S.
941 (1973).
131. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
132. Id. at 287, 292-93.
133. Id at 288.




vided considerable assurance of their reliability.' 36 Justice
Powell reasoned that the basic purpose of the hearsay rule is to
shield the jury from untrustworthy evidence.137 The state-
ments in question, however, were both reliable and critical to
the defense. The Court noted that a "mechanistic[ ]" applica-
tion of the hearsay rule such as that made by the trial judge
threatened "to defeat the ends of justice."' ss Citing Washing-
ton, Justice Powell held that the trial court ruling was
unconstitutional. 39
136. Id. at 300, 302. McDonald spontaneously made three separate state-
ments to three acquaintances. These statements, powerfully adverse to his in-
terests, were each "corroborated by some other evidence in the case." I&L at
300. The corroborating evidence included, according to the Court, "McDon-
ald's sworn confession, the testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting, the tes-
timony that McDonald was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting,
and proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and subsequent
purchase of a new weapon." Id Justice Powell noted that "if there was any
question about the truthfulness of the... statements, McDonald was present
in the courtroom .... He could have been cross-examined .... " Id at 301.
137. 1& at 298.
138. Id at 302.
139. Id. at 302-03. While Chambers unquestionably helped clarify the scope
of the accused's constitutional right to present evidence, uncertainty still re-
mained. A second ruling by the trial judge, which the Court found to be con-
stitutionally flawed, complicated the analysis in Chambers. At trial, the
prosecution did not call McDonald as a witness, thus, the defense was forced to
do so. Both before and at trial, the defense requested permission to treat Mc-
Donald as an adverse witness and therefore lead on direct examination. Id. at
291. The trial judge denied the request, ruling that under the state's
"voucher" rule, the defense had no right to lead because it had elected to place
McDonald on the stand. Id- at 295. Justice Powell held this ruling to be con-
stitutionally erroneous. Given the content of McDonald's testimony, he was
functionally one of Chambers' accusers under the Sixth Amendment Confron-
tation Clause. Id. at 297. The Confrontation Clause therefore gave Chambers
the right to conduct the direct examination as if it were a cross-examination,
including the right to lead.
Three passages in Justice Powell's opinion at least faintly suggest that the
Chambers holding was limited to its facts and that neither error alone would
have amounted to constitutional error necessitating reversal. Id- at 298 ("We
need not decide ... whether this error alone would occasion reversal .... ");
id. at 302 ("[IThe exclusion of this critical evidence, coupled with the State's
refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a trial in
accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process."); id at 303
("[W]e hold simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rul-
ings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial."). However, the Court
withdrew that suggestion when it decided Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979)
(per curiam). As in Chambers, a trial judge strictly applied state hearsay rules
and excluded evidently trustworthy, critical hearsay. Unlike in Chambers,
however, in Green the exclusion of the defense hearsay was the only error.
Nevertheless, the Court cited Chambers as controlling authority. Id. at 97. As
one state court later remarked, "In Chambers, the Supreme Court expressly
stated that it was not deciding whether the application of a single rule of evi-
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2. The Impact of the Accused's Constitutional Right on the
Admissibility of Defense Hearsay Testimony
With rare exceptions,140 the common law and statutory
hearsay rules in the United States treat the prosecution and de-
fense in the same fashion; regardless of who the proponent of
the hearsay is, the foundational requirements are the same.
Thus, defense counsel must establish the reliability of the hear-
say and, in some cases, the declarant's unavailability at trial.
The pertinent questions for the defense counsel parallel
the inquiries relevant to the prosecution under the Confronta-
tion Clause: How persuasive a showing of reliability must the
defense make, and what types of factors may the defense rely
on to satisfy the reliability threshold?
Turning first to the issue of reliability, the showing re-
quired of the defense, like that required of the prosecution, is
uncertain. If Chambers v. Mississippi 141 furnishes the bench-
mark, the standard for trustworthiness appears high. The de-
fense made a strong showing of reliability in Chambers:
McDonald four times acknowledged his guilt; he made the
statements to persons to whom he had no motive to lie; and
there was independent corroboration of McDonald's involve-
ment in the shooting. Justice Powell emphasized that the rec-
ord contained "considerable assurance" of the reliability of
McDonald's statements.14 As one commentator has noted, if
Chambers sets the standard for trustworthiness, the defense
will rarely be able to satisfy it because courts can simply distin-
guish Chambers by finding insufficient guarantees of trustwor-
thiness in the cases before them.1 43
A number of lower courts have interpreted this standard as
being quite high.1 " That view, however, is mistaken. In the
dence (i.e., the voucher rule or the hearsay rule) would result in a denial of
due process. That question was determined in Green v. Georgia ... ." Foster
v. State, 464 A.2d 986, 994 (Md. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
140. E.g., FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(3) ("A statement tending to expose the de-
clarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissi-
ble unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of
the statement.").
141. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
142. Id. at 300.
143. Churchwell, supra note 118, at 138-39.
144. Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1514-15 (l1th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Delgado, 903 F.2d 1495, 1500 (l1th Cir. 1990); Gomez v. Greer, 896 F.2d 252,
254 (7th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing present case from Chambers because hear-
say "not particularly trustworthy"), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991); People
v. Smith, 263 Cal. Rptr. 155, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (interpreting Chambers as
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course of his discussion, Justice Powell illustrated the type of
showing that the defense must make to invoke the accused's
constitutional right to present evidence by citing decisions in
which the Court held the prosecution adequately complied with
the Confrontation Clause.1' Chambers indicates that at most,
the defense must pass the standard for prosecution hearsay.
The standard applicable to defense hearsay arguably is
even lower than that governing prosecution hearsay. With
some support in the lower court case law,146 Professor Westen
has contended that "[t]here is only one point at which the jury
should not be allowed to consider the evidence-where the evi-
dence is so inherently unreliable that it cannot rationally be
evaluated."' 47 In Westen's judgment, the accused has a consti-
tutional right to present evidence critical to his defense "unless
the court concludes that the evidence is so inherently unrelia-
ble that reasonable people, properly cautioned, could not ra-
tionally rely on it."'14 If the defense hearsay satisfies that
minimal standard and bears significantly on a crucial issue in
the case, the hearsay is capable of generating reasonable doubt
and thus should be admitted.
The Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Rock v. Arkansas'49
supports Westen's argument. The issue in Rock was whether
the accused could testify to certain facts which she remembered
only after hypnotic induction. The lower courts precluded her
from testifying to those facts; they held that hypnotically en-
hanced testimony is so unreliable that it is per se inadmissi-
ble.150 On appeal, the Court vacated the accused's conviction.15
The Court found that the State had not demonstrated that
hypnotically enhanced testimony is always so untrustworthy
that a per se rule of inadmissibility is justified.' 52 The Court's
requiring "substantial indicia of trustworthiness"); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRED=,
EXCULPATORY EvIDENCE: THE ACcusED's CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INTRO-
DUCE FAVORABLE EVIDENCE 377-81 (1990) (collecting cases). This Article has
similarly pointed out that the courts have been relatively lax in evaluating
showings of reliability under the Confrontation Clause.
145. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 301 (1973).
146. Rivera v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 915 F.2d 280, 282-83 (7th Cir.
1990); People v. Sanders, 271 Cal. Rptr. 534, 567 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (Johnson,
J., dissenting); IMWINKELRIED, supr note 144, at 388-95 (collecting cases).
147. Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MIcH. L. REv. 71,
157 (1974).
148. Peter Westen, Compulsory Process 11, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 191,304 (1975).
149. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
150. Id at 48-49.
151. Id. at 62.
152. Id. at 61. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, candidly admit-
1992]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
opinion thus suggests that the prosecution may have the bur-
den on the issue of the reliability of the defense evidence. Jus-
tice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted that "the State
in Chambers did not demonstrate that the hearsay testimony,
which bore 'assurances of trustworthiness,' including corrobora-
tion by other evidence, would be unreliable."' s s Justice Black-
mun not only referred back to Chambers, he also expressly
cited Professor Westen's writings.l 4 Thus, Rock may signal a
lowering of the standard for evaluating the reliability of de-
fense hearsay.
The second issue relating to the reliability of defense hear-
say evidence concerns the factors the defense may rely on to
satisfy its burden. This Article discussed the case law gov-
erning the prosecution's burden to satisfy the reliability prong
under the Confrontation Clause. It noted that in Idaho v.
Wright, a bare majority of the Court ruled that, in assessing
the reliability of prosecution hearsay, the trial judge may con-
sider only the circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement; the judge may not factor corroborating evidence into
the assessment.155 Under California v. Green, the prosecution
has an alternative method of complying with the reliability
prong. Absent a showing of the accuracy of the declarant's
hearsay statements, the prosecution can produce the declarant
for questioning at trial.' How do the rules under the Compul-
sory Process Clause compare with these Confrontation Clause
rules?
In one respect, the compulsory process rules are more leni-
ent than those under the Confrontation Clause. Unlike the
prosecutor, defense counsel may employ independent cor-
roborating evidence as part of the basis for inferring that the
defense hearsay is reliable. In Chambers v. Mississippi, Justice
Powell cited several independent factors assuring the reliability
ted that hypnotic enhancement is a controversial technique, and that its status
in the scientific community is unsettled. I& at 59. He conceded that even the
use of the most scrupulous procedures may not eliminate all the potential in-
accuracies in hypnotically enhanced testimony. Id at 60-61. However, Justice
Blackmun noted that, in individual cases, hypnotically induced evidence may
be sufficiently reliable to warrant admission. Id Certain procedures can re-
duce the risk that the hypnotist will communicate biases to the subject and
traditional means of assessing the accuracy of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony are still applicable. Id
153. Id. at 55.
154. Id. at 52.
155. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150 (1990).
156. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970).
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of McDonald's hearsay statements.157 Similarly, the Court in
Rock v. Arkansas faulted the state courts for excluding the ac-
cused's hypnotically enhanced testimony "without regard to...
any independent verification of the information" recalled under
hypnosis.158 At this juncture, the two bodies of law are asym-
metrical: Chambers and Rock permit the defense to do what
Wright explicitly forbids the prosecution from doing. As this
Article has suggested, once the conservative majority of the
Court fully appreciates the asymmetry, the majority may de-
cide to eliminate it by overruling Wright. At the moment,
however, Wright, Chambers, and Rock all are good law.
In another respect, however, the prosecution faces an eas-
ier task in meeting its reliability requirement than does the de-
fense under the Compulsory Process Clause. California v.
Green recognizes two distinct methods by which the prosecu-
tion can satisfy the reliability prong of the confrontation guar-
antee: The prosecution may either show the trustworthiness of
the hearsay statement itself or produce the declarant, thereby
enabling the trier to evaluate the declarant while deciding
whether to rely on the declarant as a source of information. 59
In Chambers, as in Green, the Court noted that the hearsay de-
clarant was available at trial.' 6 However, the Chambers opin-
ion and the Green opinion treated that fact differently. Justice
Harlan, concurring in Green, reasoned that the declarant's pro-
duction automatically satisfied the reliability prong.'61 In con-
trast, the declarant's availability in Chambers was simply one
factor favorable to a finding that his hearsay statements were
reliable. Therefore, the declarant's availability is a more signif-
icant factor for the prosecution, sufficient in itself to satisfy the
reliability requirement.
The Court may eventually eliminate this asymmetry by ex-
157. 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973). One factor was that each of McDonald's state-
ments was corroborated by some other evidence in the case-McDonald's
sworn confession, the testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting, the testi-
mony that McDonald was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting, and
proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and subsequent purchase
of a new weapon. I&L
158. 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987).
159. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
160. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 301 (1973); Green, 399 U.S. at
161.
161. 399 U.S. at 188 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[N]otwithstanding the con-
ventional characterization of an available witness' prior out-of-court state-




tending Justice Harlan's reasoning to defense hearsay. The
Court could announce that whenever the declarant is available
at trial, the defense need not demonstrate the reliability of the
hearsay statement. Chambers lends some support to this argu-
ment. Immediately after noting McDonald's availability, Jus-
tice Powell, citing California v. Green, stated that McDonald
"could have been cross-examined by the State, and his de-
meanor and responses weighed by the jury."'162 To date, the de-
fense bar has not even urged this argument on the Court. The
Court's decision in Rock v. Arkansas'63 makes it unlikely that
the Court will embrace this argument in the near future. Rock
involved testimony from the defendant, who was unquestiona-
bly available at trial. Although the majority found that the ex-
clusion of the defendant's hypnotically-enhanced testimony was
constitutional error, it felt compelled to discuss the reliability
of this testimony. Thus, the majority assumed sub silentio that
her availability at trial did not relieve the defense of the bur-
den of making at least a minimal showing of the trustworthi-
ness of her proposed testimony.
3. The Defense's Burden of Establishing Necessity for
Resorting to Hearsay Testimony: The Declarant's
Unavailability and the Materiality of the
Hearsay Statements
This Article has addressed whether the prosecutor must es-
tablish the declarant's unavailability as well as the reliability of
the declarant's statement in order to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause. A parallel issue under the Compulsory Process Clause
is whether the accused must demonstrate a need for the
hearsay.
The issue of necessity takes the form of two questions.
First, must the defense prove necessity by establishing that the
declarant is unavailable at trial? Chambers strongly suggests
that the answer is no. In Chambers, the accused offered the de-
clarant's statements under the declaration-against-interest ex-
ception.16 Under both common law and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the foundation for that exception includes proof of
the declarant's unavailability at trial.165 In Chambers, however,
McDonald was available. He was not only physically present at
162. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 301.
163. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
164. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 292-93.
165. FED. R. EvrD. 804(b)(3).
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trial; he had also taken the stand and answered questions.' 66
The Federal Rules of Evidence define unavailability broadly,
167
but even under that definition, McDonald was not unavailable.
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that excluding the hearsay vio-
lated Chambers's constitutional right to due process. 168
The second question is whether the accused must establish
necessity in the sense that the hearsay is vital to the defense
theory of the case. This question highlights one of the most
marked differences between the standards applicable under the
Compulsory Process Clause and those under the Confrontation
Clause. In the latter setting, the prosecutor certainly does not
need to establish that the hearsay is vital to her case. On the
contrary, when prosecutorial hearsay is "crucial" to the govern-
ment's case or "devastating" to the defense case,169 it may be
more difficult for the prosecution to surmount the Confronta-
tion Clause hurdle. The prosecution may have to make a
stronger showing of reliability. Prosecution hearsay is more
readily admissible under the Confrontation Clause when it is
"of peripheral significance" to the case.'70 However, the re-
verse is true under the Compulsory Process Clause. To success-
fully invoke the constitutional right to present evidence, the
accused must persuade the judge that the testimony in question
is crucial to the defense. In Washington, the Court described
the excluded evidence as "vital."'171 The Chambers Court re-
166. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 291.
167. FED. R. EvID. 804(a); CARLSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 684-85.
168. In another case involving testimony offered under the declaration-
against-interest exception, the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted
Chambers as impliedly eliminating the requirement that the accused prove the
declarant's unavailability. State v. Barts, 362 S.E.2d 235, 240-41 (N.C. 1987).
Suppose that in a given case, the trial judge concludes that the defense
must prove the declarant's unavailability at trial. The court in Rosario v.
Kuhlman, 658 F. Supp. 1408 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 839 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1988),
addressed the standard which the defense must satisfy to prove unavailability.
Citing Confrontation Clause precedents such as Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1962), the court stated:
Those cases teach that a prosecutor need only show that he, in good
faith, made reasonable efforts to produce the absent witness. No one
has suggested--and indeed it could not be suggested-that a defend-
ant has a greater burden when he is trying to assert his Constitutional
rights than does the Government when it tries to overcome them.
Rosario, 658 F. Supp. at 1414.
169. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970).
170. Id.
171. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967).
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ferred to McDonald's hearsay statements as "critical." 172 The
Washington line of cases leaves some uncertainty as to how
material the excluded evidence must be.173 The better view
seems to be that on its face the excluded evidence must be pro-
bative enough to potentially affect the outcome of the trial.174
Of course, defense evidence can affect the outcome of a trial
merely by generating a reasonable doubt.175 However, evidence
of marginal or peripheral relevance falls short of creating such
doubt and is therefore inadequate to trigger the accused's con-
stitutional right.1 76 As a practical matter, the requirement that
the accused show the materiality of the defense hearsay is
probably the single most significant limitation on the scope of
the accused's constitutional right.
C. CIVIL CASES
Although a large body of Supreme Court cases expounds
on the constitutional right to present evidence in criminal
cases, neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court has ever
invoked a constitutional right to present evidence to overcome
the hearsay rule, or any other evidentiary rule, in a civil action.
Nevertheless, there is a strong argument that the Court should
recognize a right to present evidence in civil cases under the
procedural due process guarantee.177
The gist of the due process guarantee is a prohibition for-
bidding the government from depriving a person of property
without due process of law.' 78 A civil judicial proceeding is cer-
tainly government action.179 Civil judgments can result in a
deprivation of property rights. A plaintiff's cause of action is a
species of property cognizable under the due process guaran-
tee. 80 Hence, the one remaining question is whether the right
172. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). In Green v. Georgia,
the Court again used the expression "critical." 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979).
173. IMWINKELRiED, supra note 144, § 2-4b.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 683 (1st Cir. 1987).
177. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Case for Recognizing a New Consti-
tutional Entitlement The Right to Present Favorable Evidence in Civil Cases,
1990 UTAH L. REV. 1.
178. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
179. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.1,
at 452 (4th ed. 1991).
180. Opdyke Inv. Co. v. City of Detroit, 883 F.2d 1265, 1274 (6th Cir. 1988).
The category of property unquestionably encompasses the money, personalty,
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to present evidence is one of the procedures constitutionally
"due" in a civil action.
Just as the justices of the Court disagree over the scope of
the Confrontation Clause, there is controversy over the bound-
aries of procedural due process protection. The majority of jus-
tices on the current Court subscribe to an instrumental
conception of procedural due process.' 8 ' They believe the guar-
antee is a means to an end, a goal identified as the enhance-
ment of the accuracy of factfinding.'8 2 Through its legislatures
and courts, society makes policy choices embodied in substan-
tive rules of law. The incidents of procedural due process help
ensure that those choices are accurately enforced.
183
A minority of the justices adhere to an intrinsic conception
of procedural due process.'84 They believe that the active par-
ticipation of citizens in civil proceedings is more than a mere
means to an end; they believe that participation itself has in-
trinsic value1 as In a democratic society, citizens should actively
participate in civil proceedings that affect their interests. Citi-
zen participation affirms an individual's dignity as a human be-
ing and enables individuals to assert their rights personally. 8
6
Under either approach, the right to present evidence ought
to be an essential element of procedural due process in civil ac-
tions. From the instrumental perspective, the pivotal question
is whether recognition of this right will materially advance the
accuracy of factfinding. The answer is yes. The opportunity to
present evidence is the most fundamental means available to a
party to prevent factual error. If a party fears that the trier-of-
fact will make an erroneous finding, the party presents evi-
dence contradicting that finding. Further, one party's right to
present evidence creates a disincentive for the other party to
offer misleading evidence.' 8 7 The other party realizes that even
if the judge admits the misleading evidence, the former party
can introduce contradictory testimony that will not only rebut
or realty which the defendant may have to part with as a consequence of an
adverse judgment.
181. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITuIONAL LAW § 10-13, at 714
(2d ed. 1988).
182. Ic- § 10-13, at 718.
183. I& § 10-12, at 711.
184. I& § 10-7, at 675.
185. Id § 10-7, at 666.
186. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGs ON ADVERsARiAL JUSTICE: THE
AmERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 34 (1988).
187. I& at 3.
1992]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the misleading evidence, but will generally lower the other
party's credibility in the trier's mind.
The right to present evidence similarly qualifies as an es-
sential element of procedural due process under the intrinsic
approach. It is an axiom of procedural due process that a liti-
gant has a right to be heard 8s before being deprived of a prop-
erty interest by a governmental tribunal. That right is
meaningless unless the litigant has a right to speak actively to
the tribunal.18 9 If a litigant is to have a meaningful right to
speak actively to the tribunal and to participate in the eviden-
tiary hearing, that right must subsume the opportunity to pres-
ent evidence. 19°
A caveat is in order here. Assume arguendo that the Court
eventually extends the constitutional right to present evidence
to civil actions. Even if it does so, the Court will undoubtedly
require that the evidence in question be important or material
enough to affect the outcome of the case. All other factors be-
ing equal, a civil litigant will have more difficulty demonstrat-
ing the requisite materiality than would a criminal defendant.
A criminal defendant must show only that the introduction of
the evidence could create reasonable doubt in the trier's mind.
In Judge Weinstein's famous survey of judges in the Eastern
District of New York, most responding judges equated proof be-
188. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
189. Adjudicatory proceedings conducted by judicial tribunals are eviden-
tiary hearings. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 282 (1970).
190. There is some support in the Court's precedents for the existence of a
constitutional right to present evidence in civil actions. In one Depression era
decision the Court stated in dicta that the "fundamental requirements of fair-
ness which are of the essence of due process in a proceeding of a judicial na-
ture" include "the right to present evidence." Morgan v. United States, 304
U.S. 1, 18-19 (1938). An opinion written by Justice Holmes, Saunders v. Shaw,
244 U.S. 317 (1917), is even stronger authority. As a result of a convoluted pro-
cedural setting, a drainage district was effectively denied the opportunity to of-
fer relevant evidence in the court below. Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Holmes ruled that the proceeding violated the district's right to due
process by denying the district "a chance to put [its] evidence in." I& at 319.
However, the Court has twice rejected the "bitter with the sweet" argument in
procedural due process cases. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166-67 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.); id at 177-78, 185 (White, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); id at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting,
joined by Douglas & Brennan, JJ.); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985). The rejection is well-taken. "If the courts have any
special competence at all, it is to be found in the area of fair dispute resolu-
tion." TRIBE, supra note 181, § 10-12, at 708, 711-12. The government does not
satisfy procedural due process merely by affording citizens a hearing with
some opportunity for the presentation of evidence.
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yond a reasonable doubt with a probability of guilt of at least
eighty-five percent.191 These judges believed that if there is
roughly a fifteen percent probability of innocence, the accused
must be acquitted.
In a homicide prosecution such as Chambers, defense hear-
say creating a twenty percent probability of innocence would
satisfy this standard and would bring the accused's constitu-
tional right to present evidence into play. Suppose, however,
that the same testimony was offered by a civil defendant rather
than a criminal defendant. Assume also that the civil suit is a
wrongful death action in which the factual issues are virtually
identical to those in a homicide prosecution. The trial court
could consistently exclude the hearsay in the civil action while
admitting it in the criminal case. A criminal defendant can per-
haps gain an acquittal by establishing a mere fifteen percent
probability of innocence. In civil actions, however, the most
common burden of proof for the plaintiff is a preponderance of
the evidence-which converts roughly into a probability of lia-
bility exceeding fifty percent. 92 Realistically, a civil defendant
must strive to establish a probability of non-liability approach-
ing fifty percent. The hearsay testimony in the wrongful death
action above falls far short of that mark.
D. SUMMARY
At the end of Part I, this Article concluded that the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments would permit legislatures and courts to
go far in reducing the barriers to the admission of hearsay. The
doctrines discussed in this section may compel decision makers
191. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 402-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd,
603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
192. McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 339, at 957.
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to move in the general direction of liberalization.193 The most
powerful constitutional force compelling liberalization is the ac-
cused's implied right under the compulsory process guarantee.
The right is likely to have an especially important impact on
the common law and statutory hearsay exceptions which re-
quire foundational proof of the declarant's unavailability at
trial.194 These include exceptions for former testimony and
declarations against interest. Chambers indicates that when the
accused makes a strong showing of the hearsay statement's reli-
ability, that showing obviates the need for proof of the declar-
193. Figure II depicts the extent of the constitutional compulsion of hear-
say liberalization:
FIGURE II










Defense evidence in criminal cases. This diagram assumes arbitrarily that only
50% of the universe of hearsay possesses adequate indicia of reliability. The
diagram further assumes that only half of the reliable hearsay will be material
enough under the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Evidence in civil actions. This diagram assumes arbitrarily that only 50% of the
universe of hearsay possesses adequate indicia of reliability. The diagram further
assumes that much less than half of the reliable hearsay will be material enough
under the preponderance standard.
* Prosecution evidence in criminal cases.
194. See FED. R. EVID. 804.
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ant's unavailability. In the past, courts and commentators have
often noted that hearsay evidence faling within these excep-
tions is reliable. The California Supreme Court once champi-
oned the view that declarations against interest are so
trustworthy that there is no need for a showing of declarant
unavailability. 95 Professor Morgan remarked that the founda-
tional requirements for former testimony are so extensive that
"[w]ere the same strictness applied to all hearsay, evidence of
reported testimony would constitute the only exception to the
hearsay rule."'z Thus, in the long term, the accused's constitu-
tional right may have a major impact on the hearsay exceptions
set out in Federal Rule of Evidence 804.
However, the scope of the accused's constitutional right is
severely limited; it reaches only evidence important enough to
change the outcome of the trial. The vast majority of defense
evidence lacks that degree of materiality. The Court should
recognize a parallel right in civil actions under the Due Process
Clause, but it will be even more difficult for civil litigants to es-
tablish the necessary materiality. For its part, the government
cannot point to any constitutional theory compelling the admis-
sion of prosecution hearsay. No matter how material the hear-
say is to the government's theory of the case, the prosecution
cannot surmount common law and statutory hearsay rules.
CONCLUSION
There are a number of troublesome, unsettled questions
about the extent of the constitutionalization of hearsay doc-
trine. The greatest uncertainty is in civil cases. Will the Court
ever adopt Justice Harlan's theory that the procedural due pro-
cess guarantee can be used to police the reliability of hearsay in
civil suits? Will the Court posit the existence of the right to
present evidence, which Justice Holmes found to be an element
of procedural due process in Saunders v. Shaw,197 and in turn
permit civil litigants to rely on that right to override hearsay
barriers?
Although the body of case law on constitutionalization is
much more extensive in criminal cases, there are unanswered
questions there as well. Under the Confrontation Clause, will
195. People v. Spriggs, 389 P.2d 377, 381-82 (Cal. 1964).
196. Edmund M. Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-45, 59 HARv. L. REv.
481, 552 (1946).
197. 244 U.S. 317, 320 (1917).
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the Court adhere to the Wright' 98 rule excluding corroborating
evidence from the evaluation of the reliability of prosecution
hearsay? Under the Compulsory Process Clause, will the Court
embrace the suggestion in Rock 19 that the reliability threshold
for the defense is lower than the standard the prosecution must
satisfy?
Despite these unsettled questions, some generalizations can
be made with a fair measure of confidence. The extent of the
constitutional compulsion of hearsay liberalization is much less
than the extent of the constitutional permissibility of liberaliza-
tion.200 In every type of hearsay, the extent of the constitu-
tional permissibility of reform far exceeds the extent of the
constitutional compulsion; the latter does not even approach
the outer limit of the former. The gap between the two repre-
198. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3152 (1990).
199. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 57-58 (1987).
200. Figure III depicts the gap between the two:
FIGURE III
THE EXTENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY LIBERALIZATION
EXCLUSION OF ADMISSION OF






* Defense evidence in criminal cases.
* Evidence in civil actions.
*** Prosecution evidence in criminal cases.
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sents the constitutional latitude which legislatures and courts
have to determine the future of hearsay law.
In a sense, this topic merely defines the parameters of the
debate for the other conference participants. The Fifth and
Sixth Amendments would permit government decision makers
to go to great lengths in relaxing the hearsay barriers, but the
amendments compel the decision makers to do so only to a lim-
ited degree. The analysis of this topic is relatively easy, consist-
ing largely of description and prediction. In contrast, the
analysis of the other topics at this conference demands policy
evaluation-struggling with the question of whether and how
the decision makers should choose to exercise the discretion
conferred by their constitutional latitude. As the poet George
Moore remarked long ago, "[t]he difficulty" typically lies in
"the choice." 201
201. GEORGE MOORE, THE BENDING OF THE BOUGH 152 (1900).
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